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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-3300 
_____________ 
 
NATHANIEL RHODES, JR., 
                                                Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID A. VARANO, Superintendent/S.C.I. 
Coal Township; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
OF THE COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY; THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF  
PENNSYLVANIA 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-03236) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 25, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the 
 2 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from using 
a peremptory challenge to purposefully strike a prospective juror because of his or her 
race.  Nathaniel Rhodes, Jr., an African-American male, appeals the denial of his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the prosecutor discriminated against him when, 
in violation of Batson, he exercised a peremptory challenge against Juror #41, a non-
African-American male.  Rhodes sought a certificate of appealability only as to the 
District Court’s rejection of that specific claim, a motion which was granted by the Court 
as to the following issues:  whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s “ruling” as to 
Juror #41 “was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented,” and whether Rhodes was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
1
  App. 83.  We 
will affirm.  
 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 
habeas relief cannot be granted unless the adjudication resulted in a decision that was 
either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  If, of course, the state court did not reach the 
                                                   
1
 The only Batson challenge before the District Court and now before us is Rhodes’ 
challenge to non-African-American Juror #41.  Rhodes did not renew the Batson 
challenge he unsuccessfully made at the state court level to the prosecutor’s strike of 
Juror #5, an African-American female, struck because, among other reasons, she had a 
conviction for shoplifting and her husband worked with juvenile offenders at a placement 
home. 
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merits of a claim, these deferential standards do not apply.  Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 
707, 718 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 Rhodes argued to the District Court, and argues to us, that the “effect” of the 
prosecutor exercising his last strike against “below the line” Juror #41 (a juror who had 
no chance of being seated) was to assure that African-American Juror #33 would serve 
only as an alternate and no African-American would make it to the final twelve.  The 
District Court, in an extraordinarily thorough opinion, discussed Rhodes’ Batson claim 
and the treatment of that claim by the Pennsylvania state courts.  Given that we write 
only for the parties, who are fully familiar with this case, we need not reprise that 
discussion here.  Suffice it to say, the District Court concluded that because there was no 
evidence of record that the “below the line” strike of Juror #41 gave rise to an inference 
of a discriminatory purpose, the Superior Court’s conclusion that the prosecutor did not 
exercise his strikes in a discriminatory manner “was not an unreasonable determination of 
facts in light of the evidence presented.”  App. 22.   
 We agree.   The facts of record here do not establish a pattern of behavior from 
which any inference of discrimination can be drawn.  The order of the District Court 
denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be affirmed.   
 
 
